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Abstract 
The essential facilities doctrine is a theory first developed in US, according to which an 
undertaking can demand access to a facility controlled by another undertaking under 
reasonable terms, if this facility is essential for access of the requesting undertaking to 
a specific market. The essential facilities doctrine in EU Law is applied under article 102 
TFEU, as a special case of refusal to supply. With regards to IP rights which provide 
their owner with the power of exclusivity, the application of the doctrine first requires 
the resolution of conflicts between Competition Law and IP Law. Furthermore, special 
attention should be paid to the economic considerations behind this legal conflict. 
These issues are analyzed in the light of landmark cases of EU Courts. First in Oscar 
Bronner Case, although not related with IP rights, European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
determined the general conditions for the application of the doctrine. The requested 
facility should be indispensable, the refusal to supply by the dominant undertaking 
should eliminate competition in the relevant market and must not be objectively 
justified. In Magill Case, which was the first case before EU Courts concerning the 
application of the doctrine on IP rights, the Court applied the Bronner conditions and 
introduced the condition according to which the refusal to license should impede the 
appearance of a "new product". Afterwards, in IMS Case, the doctrine was applied on a 
copyright protected structure and Magill exceptional circumstances test was further 
interpreted. Last but not least, in Microsoft Case, the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
considered the refusal of Microsoft to supply IP protected information concerning the 
interoperability of workgroup servers as abusive and introduced a new dynamic in the 
interpretation of the doctrine’s conditions, significantly on the notion of elimination of 
competition and of new product. The dissertation ends with an overall assessment of 
the state of law followed by remarks on the application of the doctrine. 
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Preface 
The interaction between Competition Law with Intellectual Property Law constitutes a   
significant subject which has widely occupied legal scholars and jurisprudence, 
especially in Europe. This interaction comprises a variety of issues such as the 
conversation regarding the supremacy of EU law against national law, the economic 
considerations which are laid behind the legal conflict and the conditions under which 
such conflict may be resolved. The application of the essential facilities doctrine on IP 
rights constitutes a part of this open-ended discussion. This subject came to my 
attention through the lectures of prof. Pavlos Masouros who presented it in detail. The 
controversial issues arising from this topic and its interdisciplinary character were the 
sparkles of my enthusiasm to conduct this research. Prof. Masouros accepted my 
proposal for this dissertation and encouraged me to approach the subject in the light 
of landmark case law of EU Courts, which formulated and interpreted the relevant 
conditions. 
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Introduction 
Research background 
The general background of this dissertation concerns the correlation between 
Competition Law and IP Law. The primary objective of EU Competition Law is to 
establish the appropriate function of the market by preventing distortion of 
competition and market failure. Article 101 and 102 TFEU constitute the basic pillars 
which determine the limits of the undertakings’ practices that can harm or distort 
market conditions. IP Law, which is mostly regulated at national level, creates exclusive 
rights which protect the intellectual effort, creativity and innovation of its owners.  
Explanation of the title 
The subject of the dissertation concerns the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine on IP rights in the light of EU Competition Law. In several markets, there are 
structures which are considered indispensable inputs for every undertaking wishing to 
compete herein. Their possession is a sine qua non condition for market entrance. 
Under the essential facilities doctrine, a legal theory emerged from US Antitrust Law, a 
necessary infrastructure should be accessible on reasonable terms to every competitor 
so as to be avoided the monopolization of the market. The subject of the current 
dissertation presents in a concise way various theoretical and jurisprudential 
approaches concerning the conditions under which the essential facilities doctrine 
could be applied where the requested product or service is protected with IP rights.  
Aims and objectives 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to analyze the thoughts of EU Courts on 
the resolution of cases concerning the essential facilities doctrine on IP rights and to 
systematically organize these views in order to provide a complete presentation of the 
relevant subject. Furthermore, the dissertation aims to comment and investigate the 
jurisprudence in order to come up with a critical assessment of the state of law. Finally 
it aims to correspond to the practical need of undertakings so as to be provided with a 
clear explanation and guidance on this matter and to be assisted in order to avoid 
abusive practices. 
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Interest of the topic 
The essential facilities doctrine on IP rights presents a wide and interdisciplinary 
interest. It is situated in the cornerstone of correlation between Competition and IP 
Law and emerged as an amalgam of these two sectors. The scientific interest of the 
subject extends also to Economics, because the legal conflict was built up on the 
economic consideration on whether economic welfare is best pursued through the 
prevalence of dynamic efficiency or static efficiencies. IP law protects dynamic 
efficiency, while Competition law safeguards static efficiencies. Consequently, the 
relevant subject does not reflect a mere interaction of legal sectors, but demonstrates 
the high degree of interdependence between Law and Economics. 
Research questions and methodology 
The dissertation is based on the presumption that IP rights could be considered as 
essential facilities for specific markets. The first research question which attempts to 
answer is under what conditions the essential facilities doctrine is applicable on IP 
rights. Secondly, it aims to shed light to the content of these conditions and to 
comment on their interpretation by EU Courts. Finally, it endeavors, through a critical 
assessment of the state of law, to propose further ameliorations in order to resolve 
these legal conflicts more effectively.  
The methodology that was followed could be distinguished in two parts. The first part 
concerns a theoretical overview of the relevant legal and economical considerations 
which are related with the application of the doctrine on IP right, while in the second 
part, landmark decisions of EU Courts are presented. The elaboration of these 
decisions is illustrated with reference to their factual background and then to the 
Court’s findings accompanied by comments and observations of legal scholars. 
Limitations 
The analysis of the dissertation is concentrated on the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine on IP rights in the view of EU Courts, analyzing the relevant 
jurisprudence. Due to space constraints, it does not extend to a deeper analysis of the 
Commission's jurisprudence or to a comparative research vis-à-vis the resolution of 
this matter in the national legal orders of EU Member States, both considered 
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significant and interesting topics for further research. The dissertation does not cover 
also the interaction between Intellectual Property and Competition Law under article 
101 TFEU and is restricted to the analysis of refusal to supply cases under article 102 
TFEU.  
Structure 
The subject is developed in two wide chapters. In the first chapter, reference is made 
to the theoretical background of the essential facilities doctrine and to its interaction 
with IP law. The chapter starts with a brief reference to the history and evolution of 
the doctrine in US. Then, it continues with the determination of its legal fundament in 
EU, article 102 TFEU and briefly refers to the general conditions on refusal to supply. 
 Afterwards it refers to the notion of IP rights and presents the various theories 
developed to resolve the interaction between Competition Law and IP Law. The final 
part of the chapter amounts in the enumeration of the conditions of essential facilities 
doctrine on IP rights which are concluded taking into account the economic 
considerations arising in these cases. 
The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of landmark decisions of EU Courts (CFI 
and ECJ) which applied the doctrine and developed the interpretation of its conditions. 
First, reference is made to Oscar Bronner Case, which although not related with IP 
rights, its findings are important for the tailoring of the doctrine in EU Law. Then it is 
presented Magill Case related with refusal to license of copyrighted information of 
weekly TV program by three TV stations. Afterwards, IMS Case, situated in the 
pharmaceutical industry, concerned the application of the doctrine on IP protected 
structure and applied the exceptional circumstances test formed in Magill. Last but not 
least, Microsoft Case, drew the attention for its pioneering interpretation of the 
conditions for the application of the doctrine on IP rights.  
Finally the dissertation closes with conclusions, drawn from the analysis of the subject, 
containing an overall assessment of the situation in EU Law on the aftermath of these 
decisions and further thoughts regarding the more appropriate application of the 
doctrine in the future. 
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Chapter 1: The legal foundation of essential facilities doctrine and its 
correlation with IP law 
1.1. The First Steps and the Evolution of Essential Facilities Doctrine in US 
The roots of the essential facilities doctrine are traced in US. Making an overview of US 
jurisprudence, it is observed that US Supreme Court, contrary to lower courts, was 
reluctant to explicitly apply the doctrine. However, it has issued important rulings 
which applied the doctrine implicitly1. 
In Terminal Railroad Association2, Terminal Railroad Association controlled all railroad 
terminal facilities leading to St. Louis, Missouri. The Court ordered the reform of 
association’s charter in order to accept the membership of any railroad company, so as 
to provide “the use of the terminal facilities by any other railroad not electing to 
become a joint owner” and to abolish restrictions concerning the exploitation of this 
facility3. The Court’s ruling and the remedy ordered, both reflect, according to 
supporters of the doctrine that the control of a facility which is essential for other 
competing undertakings, creates for the controlling undertaking an obligation to deal 
with competitors on reasonable terms. To the same direction, the Supreme Court in 
Associated Press
4 addressed the news network ‘Associate Press’ to allow membership 
of rival newspapers, because such access was considered essential in order to 
effectively compete with the existing members5. Further, the Supreme Court in Otter 
Tail
6  ruled on the refusal of Otter Tail Power Co to sell electric power to a municipally 
owned undertaking. Specifically it stated that “Otter Tail's refusals to sell at wholesale 
or to wheel were solely to prevent municipal power systems from eroding its 
monopolistic position”7. More recent decisions, such as Aspen Skiing8 and Trinko9, 
                                                 
1
 Renda A., ‘Competition-regulation interface in telecommunications: What’s left of the essential facility 
doctrine’, Telecommunications Policy, vol. 34 no. 1-2, 2010, pp. 24-25, available from: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308596109001189 (accessed on 20 November 
2015). 
2
 United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
3
 Ibid. para 411. 
4
 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
5
 Ibid, paras 17-19. 
6
 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
7
 Ibid. para 378. 
8
 Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing, 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
9
 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko LLP, U.S. 540 (2004). 
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despite the fact that they implicitly applied the doctrine, they firmly stated their 
objections10 concerning its application and even its existence11.  
Contrary to the Supreme Court, US lower courts were more willing to recognize and 
apply the doctrine. One of the first decisions that clearly cited the doctrine was Hecht 
v. Pro-Football Inc.
12 mentioning that “where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated 
by would-be competitors, those in possession of them must allow them to be shared 
on fair terms”13. Later on, several decisions have recognized the doctrine14, with the 
most significant the decision in MCI15 which “sets forth four elements necessary to 
establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine: (1) control of the essential 
facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to 
duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; 
and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility”16. 
The divergence between the Supreme Court and lower courts has been induced by the 
question and criticism of prominent legal scholars over the doctrine17. Specifically, it 
has been supported that the doctrine lacks theoretical foundation and precise ratio. 
Additionally, it has been questioned the grade of improvement of consumer welfare by 
the application of the doctrine and its impact on innovation18. On the other hand, its 
proponents found their view by underlining the common features of the decisions 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., The Court referring also to Aspen Skiing Case, stated that: “We have never recognized such a 
doctrine and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here”. 
11
 Cotter T. F., ‘The Essential Facilities Doctrine’ in Hylton K. N. (ed.) Antitrust Law and Economics, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, pp. 158-161. 
12
 Hecht v. Pro-Football Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
13
 Ibid., para 992.  
14
 See Twin Laboratories, Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.1990), paras 11-14, 
Olympia Equipment Leasing v. Western Union Telephone Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.1986), paras 17-18. 
15
 MCI Communications Corporation and MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
16
 Ibid., para 192. 
17
 McCurdy G. V. S., ‘Intellectual property and competition: does the essential facilities doctrine shed 
any new light?’, European Intellectual Property Law Review, vol. 25 no. 10, 2003, pp. 472-473, Renda A., 
supra note 1, pp. 24-25. For further analysis of the negative issues of the doctrine see Hylton K. N., 
Economic Rents and Essential Facilities, Brigham Young University Law Review, vol. 1991 no. 3, 1991, pp. 
1243-1284, available from: 
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1728&context=lawreview (accessed on 
15 January 2016). 
18
 Lao M., ‘Networks, Access, and 'Essential Facilities': From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft’, Southern 
Methodist University Law Review, vol. 62, 2009, pp. 558-559, available from: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365934 (accessed on 20 November 2015). 
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applying the doctrine (implicitly or explicitly), such as that they all involved natural 
monopolies, which were necessary for the whole or part of the society19. 
This historic recursion on the development of the essential facilities doctrine 
amounted in the foggy background of US Law20. Every time US Courts recognized the 
doctrine, they treated it as an exceptional antitrust case of refusal to deal21. In the 
same way the doctrine has been applied in Europe. The analysis will go on with a 
reference on the legal foundation of the doctrine in Europe, article 102 TFEU, which 
sets the conditions on whether a prohibition of refusal to supply constitutes an abuse 
of dominant position. 
1.2 Refusal to supply under article 102 TFEU: The legal background of the doctrine’s 
application in EU 
Article 102 TFEU constitutes the second important pillar of EU Competition Law: the 
prohibition of abusive acts of dominant undertakings. An undertaking is dominant 
when it has “a position of economic strength […] which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and 
ultimately of the consumers”22.The provision does not prohibit the possession but the 
abuse of dominant position23. Although the definition of “abuse” forms a complicated 
problem, article 102 TFEU enumerates a non-exhaustive list of abusive practices in 
order to provide relevant guidance24.  The common characteristic of every act that 
constitutes an abuse of dominant position is its anticompetitive effect and its 
consequent harm on consumers25. 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., p. 567. 
20
 Sidak G. J. and Lipsky A. B., ‘Essential Facilities’, Stanford Law Review, vol. 51 no. 5, 1999, p. 1248, 
available from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=205668 (accessed on 22 November 2015). 
21
 McCurdy G. V. S., supra note 17, pp. 472-473. 
22
 Case C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, [1979] ECR 
00461, para 38. 
23
 Communication from the Commission- Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 
45/7, 2009, para 1. 
24
 Whish R. and Bailey D., Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 197. 
25
 Dolmans M., O' Donoghue R. and Loewenthal P.J., ‘Are Article 82 EC and Intellectual Property 
Interoperable? The State of the Law Pending the Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission’, Competition 
Policy International, vol. 3 no. 1, 2007, p. 115, available from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=987331 
(accessed on 24 November 2015). 
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In the market economy, two general rules are recognized, namely, the rule of 
contracting freedom, in the sense of choosing freely the contracting party and the 
terms of contract26,  and the freedom of disposal of property to the desirable way. 
These freedoms are enjoyed by dominant undertakings as well, and their restriction 
required an assessment of their impact on dynamic and static economy27. 
Consequently, a duty to deal under article 102 TFEU should be considered as an 
exceptional situation. Such a duty should be imposed only after serious consideration 
of its impact on investment and innovation of dominant undertakings and of its 
encouragement to competitors aiming to exploit the dominant undertaking’s efforts, 
both leading to consumer harm28.  
An abusive “refusal to supply” under article 102 TFEU, is the objection of a dominant 
undertaking which controls an input of an upstream market29, to grant this input to a 
third party and to impede its entrance in the downstream market30. This facility can be 
a product or a service, an infrastructure, information or powers stemming from an IP 
right31. Even though there’s no general consensus32, the following conditions should at 
least be fulfilled so that article 102 TFEU to be applicable in refusal to supply cases: a) 
the refusal to supply of a product or service in an upstream market, b)the dominance 
of the undertaking in the downstream market, c) the refusal harms or distorts 
competition on the downstream market, d) the refused facility is essential for effective 
competition in the downstream market, e) lack of objective justification of refusal33. 
Considering the connection between the essential facilities doctrine and article 102 
TFEU, their strong correlation is obvious. They are not two different rules, but the 
                                                 
26
 Faul J. and Nikpay A., Faul and Nikpay-The EU Law of Competition, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 
463. 
27
 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & 
Co. KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft 
mbH & Co. KG (Oscar Bronner), [1998] ECR I-07791, paras 56-57.  
28
 Communication from the Commission, supra note 23, para 75. 
29
 Upstream market is the market whose inputs are considered indispensable for the entrance into 
another (downstream) market. 
30
 Downstream is the market whose product or service requires access to an upstream product. A 
competitor shall enter the market and compete effectively only if he possessed the upstream product or 
service. See Faul J. and Nikpay A., supra note 26, p. 464, note 689. 
31
 Communication from the Commission, supra note 23, para 78. 
32
 Commission requires as an additional condition the harmful effect on consumers. See Communication 
from the Commission, supra note 23, para 81. 
33
 O’ Donoghue R. and Padilla J. A., The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing, 2006, p. 
434. 
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essential facilities doctrine can be seen as a part of abusive conducts, under article 102 
TFEU34. In the below analysis, the essential facilities doctrine is broadly interpreted and 
is not constraint to utility or transports infrastructure35. 
1.3 The relationship between IP Law with Competition Law and its status in Europe 
After the analysis of article 102 TFEU, it is necessary to present the notion of IP rights 
and to examine the relationship between IP Law and Competition Law in EU. 
First of all, IP rights are characterized by immateriality. Their protective scope covers 
the creative intellectual human production in the sectors of industry, science, 
literature and arts. They do not protect the physical property but they do protect the 
creativity or innovation that is enshrined in a specific product. However, IP rights share 
a common feature with physical property, the power of the owner to exclude 
everyone else from their use and commercial exploitation (exclusivity of IP rights)36. 
The basic IP rights are: copyrights which protect creative “literary, artistic and scientific 
works”, patents which protect inventions with novelty and applicable in the industrial 
sector and trademarks which protect the distinctive function of a sign in the 
commercial activity of an undertaking37. 
Although the efforts of harmonization in the sector of IP have commenced since the 
19th century38, nowadays, the biggest part of IP is retained in the regulation of national 
law39.  
Τhe application of essential facilities doctrine under article 102 TFEU on refusal to 
license cases, provokes a fierce discussion concerning the question about how the 
                                                 
34
 Ibid., p. 408. 
35
 The doctrine until Magill Case was mostly applied on transport infrastructures. See Joined cases T-
374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Services Ltd (ENS), Eurostar (UK) Ltd, 
formerly European Passenger Services Ltd (EPS), Union internationale des chemins de fer (UIC), NV 
Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS) and Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF) v Commission 
of the European Communities (European Night Services), [1998] ECR II-03141. 
36
 Kur A. and Dreier T., European Intellectual Property Law Text, Cases and Materials, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2013, p. 2. 
37
 Ibid., p. 3. 
38
 Abbott F. M., ’Intellectual Property, International Protection’, FSU College of Law, Public Law Research 
Paper No. 601, Business & Economics Paper, 2009, p. 5, available from: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2080214 (accessed on 8 December 2015). 
39
 Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE v. Commission, Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission of 
the European Communities (Magill), [1995] ECR I-00743, para 49. 
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conflict between EU-regulated Competition Law and national-regulated IP Law can be 
resolved.  
The two sectors of law appear to pursue different policies: IP Law creates “statutory 
monopolies” and gives to the owners of IP rights the power of exclusivity, while 
Competition Law tends to reduce monopolistic markets and phenomena of exclusion 
of market participants40. However, a deeper analysis demonstrates that IP rights and 
Competition Law pursue, in broad terms, the same economic policy which is the 
promotion of “economic welfare”, but they carry out their objective in different 
means. IP Law bolsters the improvement of dynamic efficiency41, while Competition 
Law improves static efficiencies42. Following a “more economic approach” for the 
resolution of these conflicts, the preponderance of either sector of law is based on an 
economic assessment, under which it is evaluated in the specific case whether the 
common economic policy is best pursued though dynamic efficiency or static 
efficiencies43. Another theory based on economic criteria, is the theory of “essential 
function” of IP rights, under which it is examined whether IP rights go beyond their 
economic scope (dynamic efficiency)44. In the application of this theory, it was 
                                                 
40
 It should be stressed that the term "monopoly" has a different meaning in the context of IP and 
Competition Law. In IP Law it describes the extend of the power of exclusion of the right owner, while in 
Competition Law the notion of monopoly describes the extent of market power. So, IP rights create a 
market monopoly only when these two notions coincide. See Squitieri M., 'Refusal to license under 
European Union Competition Law after Microsoft', Journal of International Business Law, vol. 11 no. 1, 
2012, pp. 77-78. 
41
 The term “efficiency” in economics, means the production or the rendering of a service in the best 
way at a minimum cost. Dynamic efficiency is related with innovation and research. According to it, 
welfare is optimized within “a time frame” in which new products and services will be created. Dynamic 
efficiency prefers to sacrifice some short term advantages such as minimization of costs for the benefits 
that would be offered to the society in the future. Schilling M. A., ‘Towards Dynamic Efficiency: 
Innovation and its Implications for Antitrust’, The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 60 no 3, 2015, pp. 191-192. 
42
 Static efficiency contains productive and allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency refers to 
production and distribution at the lowest costs. Allocative efficiency known also as distributive efficiency 
refers to the distribution of goods to the markets in which they are more valuable. Ibid., p. 192. 
43
 The deficiency of this concept is that the short term impact of static efficiencies will appear to be 
more important, giving most of times prevalence to Competition Law. See Kallaugher J., ‘Existence, 
Exercise, and Exceptional Circumstances: The limited scope for a more economic approach to IP issues 
under article 102 TFEU’ in Anderman S. and Ezrachi A. (eds), Intellectual Property and Competition Law-
New Frontiers, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 117. 
44
 The application of the essential function theory of IP rights was considered in Case T-70/89 British 
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proposed the assessment of anticompetitive intent, but this view was criticized on the 
merits that intent is a criterion inconsistent with the standardized character of the IP 
system45.In cases of collision between EU Competition Law and IP Law, EU Courts have 
adopted a more formalistic way to resolve these conflicts by distinguishing the 
existence of an IP right, defined under national law, from its exercise. According to the 
“exercise-existence dichotomy”, EU Competition Law can intervene only in the 
exercise of IP rights46. A further development of this view is the “specific subject 
matter” theory. This one lays on a distinction in the forms of exercise between the 
fundamental powers (the ‘core’) of IP rights and other conduct that may be regarded 
as a mere exercise of the right. Only in the latter case Competition Law can 
intercede47. 
Despite the dominance of the existence-exercise dichotomy in the jurisprudential 
practice of EU Courts, a reconsideration of this practice has been discussed in the basic 
cases48 which applied the essential facilities doctrine on IP rights. EU Courts introduced 
an in concreto approach based on the detection of exceptional circumstances in the 
specific case which render applicable article 102 TFEU49. 
1.4 The conditions of the essential facilities doctrine application on IP rights and the 
economic perspective of the issue 
As mentioned above, IP Law and Competition Law observe the same economic policy: 
economic (or consumer) welfare. However, IP Law pursues this objective based on 
dynamic efficiency which would benefit consumers in the distant future while 
Competition Law promotes static efficiencies whose effects are instantly obvious. The 
                                                                                                                                               
free movement of goods and freedom of competition, prevails over any use of a rule of national 
intellectual property law in a manner contrary to those principles.” 
45
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economics behind these two sectors of law play a major role in the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine on IP rights. 
On the one hand, the exclusivity conferred by IP rights enhances the incentives for 
innovation. The power of exclusivity constitutes the reward of society for the 
investments, the effort and the time spent by an undertaking in order to produce a 
new product. The crucial role of exclusivity is obvious, taking into account that the 
majority of inventive efforts do not succeed to reach the high threshold, necessary for 
protection under IP Law. In the absence of this protection, there would be no incentive 
to innovate because the new product would be accessible to everyone for commercial 
exploitation. Despite consumer’s profit from the low cost of a shared product in short 
term, the negative impact in innovation will harm consumer in long term. Economic 
researches testify the benefits of the society from the creation of new products50. The 
general idea behind IP rights is to reinforce dynamic efficiency against static 
efficiencies, in order to establish an economic incentive for investments51.  
On the other hand, compulsory licensing’s impact on welfare is twofold: it decreases 
the incentives for innovation in the long term, but in the near future it augments 
competition by decreasing the “deadweight loss of market power” and offers 
consumer lower costs due to the existence of competition in the market. The higher 
rate of exclusivity and market power conferred by the IP right, the wider will be the 
positive impact on consumers by the compulsory licensing. Additionally, a significant 
advantage of compulsory licensing is that sharing an innovative product with 
competitors will lead in its further amelioration or in the creation of new products52.  
The determination of which one of the aforementioned effects would best attain 
consumer welfare is a tough question to be answered. The conclusion of this economic 
battle results in the formulation of four cumulative conditions (adopted by landmark 
cases of EU Courts) which render compulsory licensing an obligatory order under 
article 102 TFEU. These conditions are: 
• The indispensability of the IP right in order to compete in the relevant market. 
                                                 
50
 O’ Donoghue R. and Padilla J. A., supra note 33, pp. 415-417. 
51
 Monti G., EC Competition Law, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 228. 
52
 O’ Donoghue R. and Padilla J. A., supra note 33, pp. 419-420. 
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• The exclusion of all competition in the downstream market, because of the 
refusal. 
• The prevention of appearance of a new product with substantial consumer 
demand. 
• The lack of objective justification of the refusal to license53.  
The aforementioned economic assessment, regarding compulsory licensing, is 
conducted under the auspice of the “new product” criterion. Static efficiencies prevail 
on dynamic efficiency when due to compulsory licensing an undertaking can offer to 
consumers something new, and this compulsory licensing leaves unaffected existing 
products and does not undermine subsequent innovative activity54. 
All in all, if these conditions are fulfilled, the essential facilities doctrine is applied on IP 
rights, meaning that the dominant undertaking is obliged to license its IP rights to the 
competitor under reasonable terms. The following chapter is dedicated to the 
reference on landmark EU Courts jurisprudence related with the application of the 
doctrine on IP rights and analyzes the interpretation followed by EU Courts in the 
course of time. 
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Chapter 2: The analysis of EU case Law 
2.1 Oscar Bronner Case: The introduction of the indispensability test 
2.1.1 Factual background and the conditions of the doctrine’s application 
Oscar Bronner, although it is not related with IP rights, is a case of vital importance 
because it was the first decision of the ECJ to clarify the conditions for the doctrine’s 
application55. Oscar Bronner was a publishing company which published and 
distributed a daily newspaper, with limited market share in the Austrian daily 
newspaper market56. Mediaprint was also a publishing company of newspapers which 
was dominant in the market of daily newspapers in Austria (downstream market) and 
had established on its own a national delivery scheme of newspapers (upstream 
market) in order to deliver them to its subscribers in the morning57. Oscar Bronner 
pursued judicially an order against Mediaprint in order to share its delivery scheme 
and distribute Bronner’s newspaper, under a reasonable fee58. Oscar Bronner based its 
claims on the fact that Mediaprint’s refusal to supply constituted an abuse of 
dominant position in the downstream market. The Austrian competent court referred 
the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling concerning whether the Mediaprint’s 
conduct could be considered as an abusive refusal to supply under article 102 TFEU59.  
The Court in its ruling determined the conditions which should be fulfilled for the 
application of the essential facilities doctrine under article 102 TFEU60: 
• The refusal of the facility should “eliminate all competition” in the relevant 
market “on the part of the person requesting” it.  
• There’s no objective justification for this refusal.  
• The facility is “indispensable” to carry out that business, in such a degree that 
“there is no actual or potential substitute” of the facility. 
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2.1.2 The elaboration of indispensability test 
The Court held that a requested facility is indispensable if there are no alternative 
methods to conduct the same business61 and if there are “technical, legal or even 
economic obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even unreasonably difficult” to 
anyone, alone or in cooperation, to establish such a facility62. Both the Court and AG 
Jacobs observed that the plaintiff had the burden to prove that the creation of the 
requested facility is not “economically viable”63. 
The indispensability test as elaborated by the Court was twofold: the facility should not 
be substitutable and any undertaking in the market should not be in the economic 
position to duplicate the requested facility or its alternative64. 
With regards to the substitutability of the facility, the Court required that there should 
be no equal method to conduct the same business. If there were other methods 
available, even “less advantageous” from the requested one, then the facility would 
not be indispensable. The Court was not constraint in this reference but concluded 
that in this case there were alternatives for Mediaprint’s competitors65. This statement 
raised a very serious question concerning the Court’s power to determine the 
existence of these alternatives in the procedure of preliminary ruling.  
The legal assessment of a case of abuse of dominance presupposes the definition of 
the relevant market and the existence of dominance in that market66. According to 
consistently held jurisprudence, the relevant market is composed by the ensemble of 
products which are “with respect to their characteristics […] interchangeable”.67 
However, in the procedure of preliminary ruling this assessment is left to the discretion 
of national court which asks for the ruling68.  
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 Ibid., para 43.  
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In the present case, it was observed that the examination of availability of substitutes 
coincided with the interchangeability test, which is a part of relevant market’s 
determination69. In other words, the examination of indispensability for the doctrine’s 
application constituted a part of the assessment of whether the specific undertaking 
has a dominant position. The Court seemed to proceed in a “qualitative judgment” 
which was out of its competence, and restricted the freedom of the national court. 
Nevertheless, it was presented the view that these two tests were different and the 
one conducted at the level of the indispensability test was broader than the one 
conducted for the determination of abuse of dominance70. In its conclusion, the Court 
found that there were other methods available for the distribution of newspapers but 
it didn’t examine in substance whether these methods constituted a realistic 
alternative71.  
With regards to the duplicability test, primarily, it would be exceptional rare that the 
duplication of a facility is totally impossible. Most of times, the duplicability of the 
facility is a matter of economic assessment72. The Court pointed out that economic 
weakness of the requesting undertaking for such duplication was not sufficient to 
characterize a facility as indispensable73. A facility would be indispensable when any 
undertaking in the market was not capable of duplicating it74.  
Specifically, with the statement that “any” undertaking should be incapable of 
duplication, the Court provoked a vivid discussion among legal scholars. If the Court 
was referred to any undertaking having an equivalent market power with the 
dominant undertaking, then this constitutes a limitation of abuse, because only these 
undertakings would be able to invoke an abuse. If it was implied that the 
indispensability test examines any undertaking which potentially is expected to 
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provide a substitute, then this examination would interfere to the definition of the 
relevant market75. In general, this phrasing appeared to eliminate the doctrine’s 
application solely to “natural” or “inevitable monopolies”, i.e. in markets where the 
dominant undertaking exclusively exploits a facility and the other undertakings cannot 
act in the market without suffering from loss76.  However, this view derogated from 
precedent jurisprudence77 in refusal to supply cases78. It was also criticized because it 
excluded the doctrine’s application from markets of limited competition and it 
oversaw the case where the requesting competitor would be never in the position of 
possessing the same market shares with the dominant undertaking79. On the other 
hand, the Court’s view may be justified on the basis that the dominant undertaking 
would not be in such position if the facility has been already shared with others80. It 
can be further justified as an expression of the Court’s fears to apply narrowly the 
doctrine so as to limit negative consequences on dynamic economy. 
All, in all, one can consider that a more appropriate indispensability criterion should 
focus on the risk entailed on undertakings’ innovative investments by the application 
of the doctrine. In situations of diminished risk and estimated efficiency improvement, 
the doctrine should be anyway applicable81.  
2.1.3 Elimination of competition and objective justification 
The second condition for the doctrine’s application is that the result of a refusal to 
supply should be, according to the Court, “the elimination of competition” of the 
requesting undertaking and not of every possible competitor in the market82. So, it was 
sufficient for the Court that market access is impeded for a particular and not for any 
undertaking craving to access the relevant market83. The condition of elimination of 
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competition should be construed together with the indispensability test, because it 
would be extremely difficult to find a situation where the requested product is not 
indispensable, but significantly affects competition. Nonetheless, the exclusion of 
competition only for the requested party undermined that the doctrine should be 
applied in favor of competition and not of competitors, because its scope is to allow 
entrance of efficient rivals in the market84. Regarding the third condition of objective 
justification, unfortunately neither the Court nor the AG Jacobs did elaborate on its 
meaning. 
2.1.4 General overview of the case 
The Court in Oscar Bronner recognized the threat on incentives to innovate by the 
extended application of the essential facilities doctrine and implicitly85 classified 
consumer welfare as a primary scope of Competition Law. The Court followed the 
method of interpretation of existing jurisprudence and did not deepen its analysis with 
economic considerations86. Oscar Bronner ruling reflects a shift from absolute 
economic freedom, by analyzing the conditions under which a dominant undertaking 
should supply an equally efficient competitor with its necessary input. Although the 
doctrine was not applicable in the examined factual background, the Court expressed 
its concerns to avoid elimination of efficient competitors from the market87. The 
determination of the conditions of indispensability test and elimination of competition, 
despite it narrowed the scope and application of the doctrine, it promoted legal 
certainty and predictability. From the side of competitors, the decision should be 
understood as an indication in order to be cautious when pursuing a legal order to get 
a “free ride” from an undertaking’s facility. Summarizing, Oscar Bronner appears to 
affirm the “skepticism” of previous Commission’s rulings88 on the doctrine’s broad 
application, acting in parallel as a “corrective measure” of previous jurisprudence89. 
                                                 
84
 O’ Donoghue R. and Padilla J. A., supra note 33, pp, 442 and 444. 
85
 Although AG Jacobs explicitly referred to the primary scope of consumer welfare in Case C-7/97, Oscar 
Bronner, Opinion of AG Jacobs, supra note 55, para 58. 
86
 Korah V., 2002, supra note 80, p. 820. 
87
 Monti G., supra note 51, p. 226. 
88
 Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Services, supra note 35, 
para 221. 
89
 Baches Opi S., ‘The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property Licensing in 
the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?’, Fordham 
  -20- 
2.2. Magill Case: The appearance of the exceptional circumstances test 
2.2.1 Factual background 
Three TV stations broadcasting in Ireland and Northern Ireland, BBC, ITP and RTE were 
copyright owners of their own TV listings90. Each one published its own weekly 
program guide and allowed to third magazines and newspapers to publish only the 
daily or the weekend program91. The Irish publisher Magill TV had made available a 
comprehensive weekly TV program guide, containing information for all TV stations’ 
program. The three TV stations pursued an injunction before Irish Courts based on 
their copyright infringement92. Magill complaint to Commission that this injunction 
constituted an abuse of dominance of the three TV stations which refused to supply 
their IP right for the creation of a new product93. The Commission ordered the 
compulsory licensing of the program listings by the three TV stations94. The CFI, 
retained the Commission’s Decision95 and two of the three TV stations appealed 
before the ECJ, which dismissed the appeal and upheld the existence of abuse of 
dominance under article 102 TFEU96.  
2.2.2 The definition of the relevant market 
In Magill the determination of the relevant market was very narrow: the appellants’ 
weekly programs listings and the magazines in which they were published.  This 
market was separate from the market of broadcasting services and constituted a part 
of the general market of television programs’ information. The latter was not the 
relevant market in this case, because disclosure of information solely for the daily TV 
program would not allow the publication of a comprehensive weekly TV guide97. 
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Criticism of the complexity on such a detailed division of markets was not absent98. A 
supportive element to this market's determination was the commercial success of 
weekly comprehensive television guides in other countries, which “demonstrates the 
existence of a specific constant and regular potential demand on the part of the 
viewers” for these programs99. CFI adopted this view without any addition by the ECJ. 
Nevertheless, it was supported that such a relevant market is not existent because a 
weekly TV program was not published before Magill’s initiative. The Court did not 
address this matter, but such a relevant market could be established on the basis of 
“potential consumer demand” and lack of interchangeability100 between daily and 
weekly TV program listings101. It would be unequal to impose an obligation to deal 
when the dominant undertaking markets the requested product and not to impose 
when the product is not marketed, taking into account that the latter situation is even 
“worse” for consumers102. 
2.2.3 The existence of dominant position 
The Court stated that “mere ownership of an intellectual property right cannot confer” 
a dominant position103. This means that ownership of an IP right does not necessarily 
lead to the monopolization of a market, but only grants the power of exclusivity to its 
owner104.  
The Court added in the next paragraph that the “only source” of program’s listings 
were the TV stations. This means that each TV station enjoyed a de facto monopoly 
and had the power to block the entry of a competitor in the market of weekly TV 
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listings105. A publisher of a weekly TV guide was dependent on the conduct of TV 
stations for the acquisition of the information needed, in order to produce a 
comprehensive guide106.  
The Court’s assumption was considered problematic because the information over 
which there was a de facto monopoly is the same information protected by copyright. 
It has been supported that the Court was reluctant to state that this case was an 
exceptional situation in which ownership of an IP right created the undertaking’s 
dominant position107.  
Both CFI and ECJ concluded the existence of a dominant position of the three TV 
stations. However, none of the stations separately was dominant in the market. On the 
one hand, the Court seemed to adopt that there was a joint dominance of the three TV 
stations due to the monopoly of each TV station with regard to its respective program. 
On the other hand, the lack of cooperation between the three undertakings and the 
fact that one’s refusal could lead to an insuperable barrier for market access, match 
more to the conclusion of individual dominance. Ultimately, it is remarkable that 
Magill involved “a somewhat curious hybrid between individual and joint dominance” 
which restricted access to relevant market due to the “identity of interest and 
bargaining power between the three undertakings” 108. 
2.2.4 The relationship between Competition Law and IP Law 
Another important issue which has occupied the Court is the relationship between 
Competition Law and IP Law109. ECJ mentioned that IP is rooted in national law and the 
mere refusal to license does not constitute an abuse of dominance110. Further, the 
Court relinquished the existence/exercise dichotomy, which was applied by the CFI as 
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well111, and adopted a new circumstance-based approach, known as “exceptional 
circumstances” test112. 
The Court’s initiative should be welcomed, since a rigid application of the existence 
exercise dichotomy appeared incompatible with the nature of IP rights. First and 
foremost, the creation of existence/exercise dichotomy seemed to be unfounded in 
TFEU. In Consten & Grundig113 the dichotomy was firstly established on a 
misinterpretation of article 345 TFEU (ex 222 of the Treaty of Rome) which provides 
that “The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the 
system of property ownership”. The history of this article reveals that it was not 
related with IP, but it was a provision which established the freedom of Member States 
to determine private and public property of undertakings. Consequently it cannot be a 
legal fundament of this theory114.  
Additionally, its establishment on the free movement rules would be equally 
uncompromised with IP rights. Article 36 TFEU legitimizes derogations from free 
movement rules on the ground of “protection of industrial and commercial property”. 
However, the provision came back to the rule of free movement and prohibits a 
derogative measure if it constitutes an “arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction” in intra-community trade. Taking into consideration that IP rights affect by 
their nature the conditions of competition in the relevant market, it would be 
extremely difficult to discriminate whether or not a refusal to license is, in the meaning 
of article 36 TFEU, a disguised restriction of competition115. 
The Court ruling departed from formalistic doctrines to a more case to case analysis for 
the resolution of conflicts between the two sectors of law. It is observed from its 
phrasing that it adopts a view closer to the theory of essential function of IP rights and 
elaborated on this with the exceptional circumstances test. 
Last but not least, another significant feature of the ruling is that it applied 
Competition Law in order to correct failures of the IP system. The copyright protection 
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for TV listings was profoundly disputed and the Court seemed to apply  
Competition Law as a way to limit copyright’s scope of protection in TV program 
listings at a reasonable level116. 
2.2.5 The establishment of the exceptional circumstances test 
The exceptional circumstances test was not only invoked as a way to resolve the 
interaction of these sectors of law, but it prescribed the conditions under which the 
essential facilities doctrine (and consequently article 102 TFEU) was applicable on IP 
rights.  
The Court first applied the indispensability test in a similar way as in Oscar Bronner117, 
stating that there was “no actual or potential substitute for a weekly television guide” 
(lack of substitutability)118 and that the three TV stations were “the only sources” of 
necessary information for the publication of comprehensive weekly TV program guides 
(lack of duplicability)119. Nonetheless, the Court required for the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine the presence of three “exceptional circumstances”: Firstly, 
the result of refusal to license should be the prevention of “the appearance of a new 
product”, not previously offered and “for which there was a potential consumer 
demand”120. Secondly the refusal should amounts in elimination of competition of the 
relevant market.121 Thirdly, the refusal could not be objectively justified122. 
Concerning the condition of new product, it has been supported that such a condition 
should not be a general prerequisite for the application of the essential facilities on IP 
rights123. If this view was correct, then the doctrine would be applied in cases where 
the requesting undertaking would be a direct competitor of the dominant undertaking 
and would market the same product by exploiting this “free-ride” of the facility124.  
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Another question that arises from the elliptic Court's wording is whether the new 
product should be placed in a separate or in the same product market of the dominant 
undertaking. It has been supported that the “two separate markets” requirement 
would impose very high threshold to the doctrine’s application and would threaten the 
whole application of the doctrine. Turney supports that it is sufficient for the plaintiff 
to prove the creation of a distinct product and not the product’s placement at a 
separate market125. In contrary, Temple Lang considers more appropriate that the new 
product should not compete with the existing one protected with the IP right, because 
such a situation constitutes a justification of “interference in the specific subject 
matter of the copyright”126. 
The condition of the “new product” highlights the abusive character of the 
undertaking’s conduct to exclusively retain a statutory monopoly. When it comes to IP 
rights, ECJ puts an additional requirement to the indispensability test of Oscar Bronner: 
that the IP right owner fails to correspond to consumer demand in the downstream 
market127. 
Concerning the elimination of competition condition, in Oscar Bronner the Court 
required for the application of the essential facilities doctrine, the exclusion of a 
specific undertaking from competition in the relevant market. In Magill it adopted 
previous jurisprudence by requiring that the elimination of competition in the 
downstream market should be absolute, concerning any undertaking and not only the 
plaintiff. This meant that the dominant undertaking should monopolize the 
downstream market128. Finally, the Court neither in Magill provided specific guidance 
concerning the last condition of objective justification. 
2.2.6 General overview of the case 
The Court in Magill did not explicitly apply the essential facilities doctrine on IP rights 
but it appeared to insinuate its application with reference to the exceptional 
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circumstances test129, despite the criticism to the doctrine’s extension on IP rights130. 
The application of the “exceptional circumstances test” first of all constituted the 
Court’s departure from the existence/exercise dichotomy in the resolution of conflicts 
between IP Law and Competition Law131.  Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate 
on the exact content of these circumstances and created a degree of uncertainty to 
dominant undertakings with regard to their investments in innovation132. This attitude 
of the ECJ could be interpreted as "an unwillingness to confine itself doctrinally"133, 
though it created more problems than solutions. The enumeration of the exceptional 
circumstances appeared to be cumulative, although the Court had not specified it134. In 
this context, the indispensability test together with the exceptional circumstances, 
depict the conditions of the essential facilities doctrine on IP rights. The addition of the 
“new product” condition limited the doctrine’s application on IP rights and required a 
proof that consumers would benefit more from the sharing of the IP right and from the 
establishment of competitive conditions in the market than from the retention of 
innovation in the hands of the dominant undertaking135. In general, the circumstance-
based approach adopted in Magill allows a substantial application of the doctrine, with 
respect to the nature of IP rights136. However, the Court did not elaborate on what 
happens in cases of really valuable IP rights and whether the dominant undertaking 
markets or plans to market the requested IP right137. Finally, the Court acted not only 
as an enforcing mechanism of competition but as “corrector” of the national IP 
system’s failures.  
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2.3 IMS Health Case: Further light on the exceptional circumstances test 
2.3.1 Factual background 
IMS Health was a dominant undertaking in Germany and marketed regional sales 
information to pharmaceutical laboratories. IMS performed this task using a specific 
structure under which Germany was separated in 1860 parts (“bricks)138. The fact that 
the structure was formed with customer’s contribution and was provided freely to 
doctors, testifies that such a structure was a market standard139. NDC Health was a 
competing undertaking in the same market. Due to customer’s resistance in an 
alternative structure, NDC decided to use a structure similar to 1860 bricks 
structure140. In the first phase of the case, IMS proceeded before national courts in 
order to stop NDC’s actions, due to copyright protection of the structure141. Then, NDC 
filed a complaint before the Commission, claiming that the refusal of IMS to license the 
IP right constituted an abusive conduct. Commission ordered compulsory licensing of 
the structure in the form of interim measures142. After the dismissal of IMS’s appeal 
against this order, the Commission withdrew the interim measures, due to the lack of 
an emergency situation143.  
In the second phase of the case, IMS went before national courts pursuing to prohibit 
to NDC from using the 1860 brick structure144. The national court referred three 
questions for preliminary ruling before the ECJ concerning: a) the conditions under 
which a refusal to license is abusive, b) the extent and the role of customer’s 
participation to the creation of the structure and c) the costs of customers in order to 
adopt a new structure145. As observed in Oscar Bronner, the Court in the procedure of 
preliminary ruling gives an interpretational guidance on EU Law leaving the application 
of its outcome on national courts146.  
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2.3.2 The cumulative approach  
The Court clarified the vacuum of Magill, by providing that the conditions147 of the 
exceptional circumstances test are “cumulative”148. It upheld that its interference in 
the economic and contractual freedom of undertakings should be restricted only in 
cases where all circumstances lead to a serious anticompetitive result. So, the 
cumulative approach guarantees the gravity of the anticompetitive impact. Criticism 
on this viewpoint is not absent on the grounds that the Court in Oscar Bronner 
referred to Magill criteria neglecting the new product requirement and in Landbroke149 
it regarded the new product criterion as an alternative and not a prerequisite150. 
However, the importance of this criterion has been already mentioned and it has been 
stressed that it constitutes the legal basis for the Court to assess economically whether 
static efficiencies prevail on dynamic151. So, at least in the context of IP rights it is 
better to be considered as a requirement and not as an alternative.  
2.3.3 The concept of “separate markets” and elimination of competition 
In refusal to supply cases the Court is required to distinguish between an upstream 
market and a downstream market152. In IMS the Court made this distinction based on 
the difference between “stages of production” and on market “interconnection”, in a 
way that inputs of the former are indispensable for access to the latter153. It further 
considered that the upstream market is not needed to be actual but it can be “a 
potential market or even hypothetical market”154. 
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In IMS the market distinction has been conducted on the basis of IP rights. The 
downstream market was the market on which rests the innovation of the IP right 
(supply of pharmaceutical data) and the upstream market covered the application of 
the specific IP right (the copyrighted structure used for the transfer of these data)155. 
The reference to potential or hypothetical upstream market stressed that it was 
irrelevant the separate marketing of the input. The vital element was its essential 
character for market access156. In the context of IP rights, it would be always possible 
to envision a potential market in the IP itself. However, such an approach could be 
questioned on the merits that the subject of protection of IP right is the mean to 
compete and not a separate market157. Further it could easily lead to the conclusion of 
abuse when the right holder merely seeks to exploit the IP right protected product158.  
In IMS, it was not clear the Court’s position on the relevant market concept. Some 
authors regard the ruling to have maintained the distinction of two separate 
markets159, others interpret it as a departure from the “two separate markets” concept 
to the mere existence of different productive stages and consumer demand for 
them160.  
Whatever may be the explanation of the ruling, it can be concluded that the Court at 
least lowered the threshold for the distinction of separate markets. This new approach 
facilitated the fulfillment of the condition of elimination of competition: the easier is 
the distinction between two the markets, the easier would be the conclusion of 
elimination of competition. At first sight such an extensive interpretation seemed to 
enable any competitor of the dominant undertaking to access its IP right and compete 
with it in the downstream market161. Nonetheless, the Court counterbalanced this 
negative impact through the stricter application of the “new product” condition162. 
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2.3.4 The indispensability test and the role of customers’ conduct in its formulation 
In the application of the indispensability test the Court reaffirmed the criteria applied 
in Oscar Bronner163. In IMS, two additional situations had to be considered: the degree 
of customers’ participation in the creation of the structure and the costs they have to 
undertake in order to use a new one.  
The indispensability test in Oscar Bronner seems that it did not provide enough space 
for the assessment of these situations. AG Tizzano introduced their assessment 
through the duplicability test, noting that they constitute “financial obstacles” which 
would make the duplication of an alternative structure very onerous to the 
competitor164. He concluded that the economical overburden of customers to adapt 
their attitude in a new structure would lead to its failure. As a result, access to the 
existing structure would be essential165. The Court was in accordance with the opinion 
of the AG Tizzano but used a broader language and stated that the participation of 
pharmaceutical laboratories (customers) in the development of the relevant structure 
created their dependence on the structure. Consequently, an alternative product 
would not be economically viable due to this dependence166.  
It has been argued that a deficiency of the exceptional circumstances test is that it 
does not cover situations of external market failure, i.e. situations of external market 
circumstances such as standardization cases or lock in and network effects167. In these 
instances, despite the fact that duplication of an alternative facility is possible, these 
external factors render it in practice obsolete or very onerous for the producer- 
undertaking. The Court in IMS, having to deal with an instance of external market 
failure, resolved the matter by the extension of the indispensability criterion168.  
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To sum up, the Court considered that the IP right of the 1860 brick structure has been 
standardized in the relevant market rendering the creation of an effective alternative 
impossible169.  
2.3.5 The “new product” requirement 
Both the Court and the AG Tizzano170observed that this condition hosts the economic 
balance between static and dynamic efficiency. The refusal to license is abusive when 
the requested undertaking “does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the 
goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the owner of the 
intellectual property right, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered 
by the owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand”171. 
The Court had to assess two sub-conditions: the novelty of the input and the existence 
of potential consumer demand. The second requirement seems easier to be fulfilled, 
because an undertaking would not market an input without being demanded by 
consumers. For the novelty sub-criterion the opinion of consumers is determinative as 
well, and the Court did not elaborate further in its meaning. Consequently, it is 
proposed its restrictive interpretation172. Additionally, the Court in IMS introduced the 
element of plaintiff’s “intention” not to market the same product with the dominant 
undertaking. However, this element implies that compulsory licensing is permissible 
even when the plaintiff aims to market something new, despite its expressed intent to 
compete in the same market with the proprietor of the IP right173.  
In IMS the narrowing of two-market requirement was balanced by the retention of the 
“new product” condition, despite the fact that emphasis to the latter presents a level 
of uncertainty. Nevertheless, one may interpret this emphasis to the contrary, i.e. that 
the plaintiff should not interfere to the market controlled by dominant undertaking 
but to a distinctive one. When two separate markets are distinguished, the new 
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product is a minimum guarantee that the product marketed by the plaintiff would be 
at least “differentiated” from the existent one174.  In this context, it is obvious the pro-
dynamic efficiency function of this condition with parallel respect to economic 
freedom of dominant undertaking175. 
Another objection which has been raised concerning the new product condition is that 
it is not in conformity with the nature of copyrights. While copyright ensures the 
economic exploitation of an input based on its creativity, patents and technical 
intellectual property are based on the novelty and the inventive character of the input. 
Additionally, in most legal systems compulsory licensing is known only in the latter 
group of rights176. Consequently, the application of the new product criterion and 
simultaneously the restriction of “elimination of competition” condition in IMS may be 
negatively assessed177. Nonetheless, such a criticism should not cover Magill and IMS 
cases, taking into account that the protection of TV listings or sales database with 
copyright was ambivalent178.  
Concerning the determination of the degree of novelty required, the recourse on 
economic criteria is not only advisable but necessary, in order to define the framework 
of the “new product” condition. As suggested by Aldhorn, Evans and Padilla a new 
product “is one that satisfies potential demand by meeting the needs of consumers in 
ways that existing products do not”. The appearance of this product leads to the 
expansion of the market by including consumers, who could not be satisfied in the 
past. It establishes in the same relevant market of the existing products a “new option 
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not just variations” of the product supplied. In this case, market’s expansion should be 
considerable179.   
2.3.6 General overview of the case 
The IMS ruling although it upheld a reserved view on compulsory licensing, it 
presented the cumulative conditions under which the essential facilities doctrine is 
applicable on IP rights180. The Court took a broader view in the Oscar Bronner test of 
indispensability, and gave special gravity to the condition of new product. The decision 
in IMS reflects in substance a departure from “two market leveraging” to “two product 
tests” and pointed out the high degree of plaintiff’s dependence on the protected IP 
right181. All in all, one can conclude two significant remarks concerning the application 
of the essential facilities doctrine: Firstly, even though it is not clear if two separate 
markets are needed, at least the Court seemed to widen the notion of separate 
markets in order to cover even subtle differences in the productive stages. Secondly, 
the Court showed its respect to IP Law but prohibited practices of dominant 
undertakings which would impede the appearance of new products and services182.  
2.4 Microsoft Case: A new dynamic on the doctrine conditions 
2.4.1 Factual background 
Microsoft was dominant in the market of client PC operating systems and in work 
group operating systems. Several software companies complained before the 
Commission, that among others, Microsoft’s refusal to disclose interoperability 
information constituted an abuse of its dominant position which eliminated access of 
these undertakings to the downstream market. Interoperability information was 
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protected by IP right (trade secret) and was the essential information needed to these 
undertakings in order to compete in the same market with Microsoft. Commission 
recognized by its decision the abusive conduct of Microsoft and the latter appealed 
Commission’s decision before the CFI183. 
2.4.2 The cumulative approach and the definition of the relevant market 
A remarkable point of the Microsoft’s ruling is the confirmation of the cumulative 
approach firmly established in IMS. However, the phrase “in particular” the 
“exceptional circumstances” under which the essential facilities doctrine is applicable, 
may imply that other circumstances might be possible to exist and provoke the same 
effect184.  
Before the analysis of the specific conditions, reference should be made to the 
definition of the relevant market. The CFI required for the application of article 102 
TFEU the existence of two separate markets. It distinguished the upstream market 
which was the market of the work group server operating systems and the 
downstream market which was the client PC operating system185. 
It is supported that such a broad determination of the downstream market was not in 
line with previous jurisprudence. In Magill and IMS, the Court defined the relevant 
market on the basis of the plaintiff’s claims. Although this broader definition ensured 
that it was in reality impossible for the requesting undertaking to acquire the upstream 
product186, it seems to be problematic for two reasons: firstly, the Court could not 
define the exact degree of interoperability needed for access and secondly, the 
broader definition included operators who were not in need of interoperability 
information for client PC operating systems. Due to the second reason the Court 
adopted a more flexible approach regarding the conditions of indispensability and 
elimination of competition187.   
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2.4.3 Indispensability and elimination of competition 
The CFI established the indispensability of interoperability information by highlighting 
its important role for access in the relevant market and by pointing out that its lack 
would lead even to a gradual elimination of competition188.  
It was supported that the conclusion of indispensability in a market where other 
undertakings, such as Linux, can, to some extent, interoperate with Windows client 
operating system, was the first negative point of the broad market definition189. 
It is true that CFI lowered the threshold of Oscar Bronner indispensability test, under 
which the existence of “even less advantageous” and economically viable alternatives, 
would not allow to consider a product as indispensable. CFI took the view that 
interoperability information is indispensable because it was the only solution for 
competitors to reach an equal position with the dominant undertaking190. 
Furthermore, the ruling reflects a departure from the formalistic and technical 
indispensability test to a more economic approach. Such an approach may reduce the 
level of legal certainty with regard to the conditions of the doctrine’s application and it 
is doubtful if it could be applied correctly due to the limited competence of EU 
authorities in factual assessment. Its vagueness, would also lead to an easier 
conclusion of abuse in these cases191. However, the positive aspect of the approach of 
CFI was that it considered the indispensability test in order to establish “competition in 
the market” and not “competition for the market”192.  
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The CFI analyzed indispensability of interoperability information in connection with 
elimination of competition. In this context two significant remarks should be 
highlighted. Firstly, article 102 TFEU should be applied even when there is a “risk” of 
elimination of competition in the relevant market, because the provision aims to 
safeguard undistorted competition level in the market. Secondly, CFI mentioned that 
refusal should eliminate “effective competition” in the market because the “marginal 
presence” of undertakings is not adequate to establish an undistorted competition 
level193.  
The element of “risk” of elimination was in line with the objective to preserve 
undistorted competition pursued under article 102 TFEU. This phrase emphasized the 
preventive role of Competition Law and clarified that it is possible to interfere even 
when there is possibility of market distortion194. The condition of foreclosure of 
“effective competition” expanded the doctrine’s application in cases where the 
existing competitors “are marginalized or substantially weakened” in a way that they 
do not exercise competitive pressure on the dominant undertaking195. It was 
supported that the new approach of effective competition, was the second 
modification of the CFI due to the wide market definition, because elimination of 
whole competition in the market was not fulfilled196. Temple Lang criticized this 
approach mentioning that an input is truly essential only when all competition is 
excluded197. Nevertheless, this extension has led to an important step forward: CFI 
adopted a substantial notion of competition which does not mean the mere existence 
of more undertakings acting in the same market, but the presence of effective 
competitors which exercise market pressure to the dominant undertaking198. In this 
way it can be avoided the tolerance or maintenance of friendly or small competitors, 
who would allow the dominant undertaking to invoke that not all competition is 
eliminated199. 
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2.4.4 The reform of “new product” requirement 
The CFI adopted an alternative approach vis-à-vis the condition of new product. It 
stated that the prevention of appearance of a new product is not the sole indication of 
“consumer prejudice”. It noted that under article 102(b) TFEU, “prejudice of 
consumers” was not only provoked by the reduction of production but by “limitation 
of technical development” as well. It concluded that article 102 TFEU covered both 
direct and indirect prejudice of consumers200. 
This novel interpretation201 meant that refusal to license is abusive not only in cases of 
prevention of new product appearance but also when it impeded the technological 
improvement of an existing one. The CFI’s view can be explained because Windows 
present the characteristic of a de facto monopoly in the market due to consumers’ 
wide acceptance. Although protected with an IP right, interoperability information was 
necessary for competition in the market of client PC operating systems. Without access 
to that information, full interoperability could not be achieved202 and Microsoft would 
leverage the upstream market thought its dominant position in the downstream 
market. Consequently, total interoperability was in favor of consumer interests, 
because such information has become a de facto standard in the market203. 
The high standards of new product condition of Magill and IMS would not be reached 
because, after the disclosure of interoperability information, competitors would not 
market a distinctive and novel product to consumers. CFI’s approach may be criticized 
because it foresaw the essential function of IP rights giving the chance to competitors 
to act in the same market with the dominant undertaking by marketing a similar 
product. Additionally, the notion of “technical development” is very broad and could 
allow “free rides” to requesting undertakings which would market the same product 
slightly improved. This novel approach of the CFI matched better the IT sector, but one 
can argue that such an approach would lead to a sector-regulated Competition Law. In 
general, the criticism on Microsoft’s approach is that it went beyond the necessary for 
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the doctrine’s application on IP rights, it reduced legal certainty and threatened the IP 
system’s effectiveness204. 
Despite the aforementioned criticism, from an economic perspective, one can observe 
that the new approach of the CFI was more accurate than the new product condition 
in Magill and IMS. The interpretation of “new product” in Microsoft was based on 
incentives to innovate. It was argued that a compulsory licensing may augment the 
innovative efforts of competing undertakings. The effect of the compulsory licensing 
may be that it would raise incentives of competitors to innovate and would not reduce 
Microsoft’s incentives. On the other hand, if no compulsory licensing was ordered, 
then Microsoft would be the only actor in the downstream market and would not have 
incentives to innovate. So, CFI’s new criterion is based on the positive results of 
“follow-on innovation” which would favor consumers205. CFI considered that access of 
competitors to interoperability information would not amount in the production of 
clone-products but in differentiated and technologically innovative ones206. All in all, 
the phrase of Monti “rivalry is the key to efficiency” describes in the most precise way 
that the establishment of effective competition may improve dynamic efficiency as 
well207.  
Examining the matter by both sides, the introduction of technological improvement in 
the new product test could threaten legal certainty and could made the essential 
facilities doctrine applicable in cases of slight amelioration of existing products. 
Although it should be reminded that the notion of “technological development” is a 
part of the exceptional circumstances test and as such should be narrowly construed in 
order to avoid unreasonable extensions208. 
2.4.5 Objective justification and burden of proof 
In Microsoft, it was the first time that a court at EU level gave some guidance 
concerning the notion of objective justification for the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine on IP rights. The CFI mentioned that the mere possession of IP rights 
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can constitute an objective justification only if it is accompanied by a significant impact 
on dynamic efficiency209. 
Nonetheless, the CFI gave little guidance and did not shed further light on the notion 
of objective justification, which remained a “black hole”.  Legal scholars assume that 
an objective justification can be based on “legitimate commercial, technical and 
efficiency reasons for refusing to license”. This is the case when access to the IP right 
would impede or seriously harm the dominant undertaking's business or when access 
would degrade the quality or the integrity of the relevant market. Exceptional 
situations in trade and contradiction with public policy may be regarded as objective 
justifications too. Other grounds for justification may be found when the dominant 
undertaking proves that it plans to market the new product on its own or when the 
economic survival of the undertaking rests solely on the requested IP right. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be characterized an objective justification neither the 
anticompetitive intent of the dominant undertaking, because every refusal to supply 
aims to preserve a competitive advantage, nor the lack of prior deal between the 
dominant undertaking and the plaintiff. It is anticipated by EU courts and authorities to 
provide a clearer guidance for the application of this condition210.  
Unlike the CFI, further guidance concerning the notion of objective justification has 
been also provided by the DG Competition Commission Discussion Paper 2005, which 
enumerates grounds such as the distortion of the market conditions by the refusal, the 
lack of technical knowledge by the requesting undertaking in order to exploit the IP 
right and the establishment of minimum compensation for investments211. 
Another important feature of Microsoft was that the Court clarified the burden of 
proof for both parties. The plaintiff should prove the necessary facts which establish an 
abuse of dominance, while the defendant has the burden of proof to support the 
existence of an objective justification. However, plaintiff has again a chance and a 
burden to prove that arguments and facts of the defendant could not prevail on the 
application of article 102 TFEU212. Unfortunately, it was observed that the CFI in 
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Microsoft required from Microsoft a higher threshold of proof concerning the facts 
that objectively justified its refusal while it considered sufficient the limited and 
generally described proof which was filed by the Commission in order to support its 
claim for abusive refusal to license213.  
2.4.6 General overview of the case 
Microsoft’s approach armed the EU authorities with a new dynamic in the formulation 
of the essential facilities doctrine. The indispensability requires an economic viability 
assessment; the new product condition was extended to cover in its scope 
technological development considerations; the effect of the abusive conduct should be 
elimination of effective competition and the mere claim of the value and the existence 
of disincentives to innovate do not constitute an objective justification214. 
This expansion of the doctrine’s conditions is not deemed adequate for every market. 
The Microsoft approach was oriented to be applied in cases of super-dominance or 
“quasi monopolies”215 and in cases referring to markets with high entrance standards. 
The CFI lowered the standards and adopted a broad and lenient approach in the 
interpretation of the doctrine’s requirements. In Microsoft, the high threshold of 
access to the IT market was appropriate for the new interpretation. CFI assessed the 
market conditions and tailored the doctrine accordingly.  Compulsory licensing is 
treated in these cases as a necessary element to guarantee access for competitors who 
would further develop this technology and innovate216. So, the economic features 
behind Microsoft led to this interpretation.  From this observation it can be concluded 
that the higher the entrance threshold in the market, the wider would be the 
interpretation of the doctrine’s conditions. However, the drawback of Microsoft is that 
the CFI did not mention if the new approach was applicable in general or only for 
specific markets, creating in this way legal uncertainty amongst undertakings217. 
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Conclusions 
After the analysis of the theoretical background and the jurisprudential practice of EU 
Courts in the application of the essential facilities doctrine on IP rights, it is necessary 
to proceed to an overall assessment of the state of law in order to extract guiding 
directions on the doctrine’s application and to elaborate on further improvements. 
Before the assessment of EU Law, further clarifications should be made considering 
the economics behind the law. The doctrine reflects the conflict of efficiencies in 
economics and the question of which efficiency should prevail for the promotion of 
general economic welfare. It may be supported that dynamic efficiency should be 
safeguarded until its protection leads to grave market damages. This means that IP 
rights should be protected to the extent that they do not seriously harm the market 
structure or consumer interests.  
In the field of law, the first significant remark is the tailoring of the exceptional 
circumstances test, as a mean of EU Courts to balance the interaction between 
Competition Law and IP Law. Moreover, EU Courts, through this test, intervene as 
indirect and corrective regulators to the failures of the national-based IP system.  
Although, the conditions for the doctrine’s application were uniformly applied, they 
were given different interpretations in each judgment. In Magill and IMS the 
conditions for the doctrine’s application were in principle narrowly drafted, while 
Microsoft presented a more flexible and economic based approach of the doctrine. 
The prerequisite for the application of the doctrine on IP rights is the definition of the 
relevant market(s). The traditional view to distinguish between two separate markets 
does not seem convincing. EU Courts appear to require in the newest decisions the 
more flexible criterion of the distinction between two different productive stages, 
interconnected in a way that the first deemed necessary for access to the other. 
Concerning the indispensability of the IP right, all the aforementioned decisions 
adopted as basis the Oscar Bronner approach. The extension of the indispensability 
test in IMS, in order to cover external factors should be welcomed. However, the 
approach of Microsoft, which concluded the existence of indispensability whenever 
the competitor could not reach the standards of the dominant undertaking, it is 
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doubtful if it could be generally applied, due to the high level of triggering into IP 
rights’ exclusivity.  
Contrary to the indispensability test, Microsoft seems to indicate the best way to 
interpret elimination of competition. Microsoft relinquished the absolute foreclosure 
of competition required by Magill and IMS and applied the doctrine in cases of “risks” 
of elimination of “effective competition”. In other words, it promoted a substantial 
examination of market conditions and considered that the doctrine should be 
applicable in cases with real competitive distortions. 
Regarding the central condition related with IP rights, the new product condition, EU 
Courts analysis was very concise. In Magill and IMS there was no elaboration on its 
notion. It was only stated that the new product should not be a clone of an existent 
one. It can be supported that the new product in these cases had the notion that the 
plaintiff should market something  new and distinctive which satisfies consumer needs 
in a way that existing products could not, and due to its circulation it is estimated the 
expansion of consumers in the relevant market. In Microsoft, the CFI recognized an 
alternative approach by lowering the threshold of novelty. It required that the refusal 
to license should not impede “technological development”. Although this notion 
reflects the avoidance of consumer prejudice, it is too vague to be generally accepted 
and goes beyond the scope of the doctrine leading to absolute disregard of IP rights. 
Last but not least, the condition of objective justification remained a notion not 
unraveled by EU Courts. It may be supported that these justifications would relate 
mostly with risks on the economic soundness of the dominant undertaking and with 
public policy considerations (See Appendix Table 1 for a comparative table on the 
interpretation of the conditions of the doctrine).  
Despite the general overview, it can be observed from the analyzed decisions that the 
stricter or broader application of the doctrine depends on the structure of the relevant 
market. In situations where market access is easier the application of the doctrine 
should be closer to the analysis of Magill and IMS, while in situations of high threshold 
of market access or network effects, the doctrine should be broadly construed as in 
Microsoft. However, this situation does not establish legal certainty for dominant 
undertakings. 
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Consequently, the application of the doctrine on IP rights which resolves situations of 
market leveraging due to the exercise of IP rights, , is a significant but not the most 
effective solution. The difficulties of the doctrine’s application, taking into account the 
evidence required for its invoking, should be dealt with legislative initiatives. The first 
aim is the achievement of harmonization of IP Law at EU level. In this way, EU 
legislator would define the proper scope of IP protection and would avoid conflicts 
between national and EU law in cases of interaction of IP Law and Competition Law. 
Also, a modification of IP Law should enhance the powers of IP authorities in order to 
assess the market structure and the possibilities of anticompetitive effects before 
granting the relevant right. Finally, in markets with special characteristics, the doctrine 
would be applied more effectively, through legislative or regulatory intervention218. 
In conclusion, Competition Law, through the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine on IP rights, can intervene to avoid failures of the IP system which distort 
market conditions. However, EU authorities should apply the doctrine with great 
responsibility by assessing the economic considerations behind the rule of law and by 
establishing consistency in the application of the doctrine, to the extent possible. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Comparative table of the EU Case law on the essential facilities doctrine on IP 
rights 
 
 Oscar Bronner Magill IMS Microsoft 
Relevant market -Distinction 
between upstream 
and downstream 
market (traditional 
view). 
-Potential or 
hypothetical 
relevant market 
based on 
consumer demand 
and not in the 
existence of an 
actual market 
(elliptic view). 
-Distinction in 
productive stages 
and 
interconnection of 
these stages 
-Potential or 
hypothetical 
upstream market. 
-Upheld IMS. 
Dominance -* -Dominance was 
identified in the 
context of IP 
rights’ exclusivity. 
- - 
Indispensability -Substitutability 
test: no other 
alternatives, even 
less advantageous 
-Duplicability test: 
impossible or 
unfeasible the 
duplication of the 
facility or its 
alternative by any 
undertaking. 
-Upheld Oscar 
Bronner. 
-Extended Oscar 
Bronner in order 
to cover situations 
of external market 
failure. 
-Consideration of 
the needs of 
requesting 
undertaking in 
order to reach an 
equal level with 
the dominant 
undertaking. 
Elimination of 
competition 
Elimination for the 
requesting 
undertaking. 
Elimination of all 
competition. 
Upheld Magill. Risk of elimination 
of effective 
competition. 
New product - -No imitation of 
existing products. 
-Intention not to 
market the same. 
 -Novelty of 
product and 
potential 
consumer 
demand. 
-Barriers to 
technological 
development for 
the creation of 
innovative 
products. 
Objective 
justification 
- - - -Not sufficient 
only the IP 
protection of the 
requested facility. 
*The symbol (-) means that in the relevant case the Court did not elaborate on this condition. 
 
 
